Nigerian security landscape has grown more easily volatile over the past 15 years, with incidents related to bombs that developed from isolated attacks into patterns of violence involving many actors in almost all regions. Comprehensive review of bombing data from 2010 to 2025 revealed how what began as a series of rebel attacks in northeast has turned into a national problem involving separatist movements, armed gangs, ethnic militias, and unknown groups.
The early years of this time line, especially between 2010 and 2015, were dominated by a single group that was famous for its deadly tactics. This faction mainly targets high density city centers and government installations, launching coordinated bombings that kill scores. Important incidents during this phase include explosions on Plateau (2010), Abuja (2011 and 2012), Kaduna (2012), and recurring attacks on Borno, which will remain the most affected country for the entire 15 -year period.
In 2016, the situation changed more complex. The initial rebel group separated, giving rise to rival factions. One of these groups, is more structured and ideologically in line with the global network, continues to use improvisation explosive devices (IED) in strategic locations throughout the northeast. The attack on Borno in 2016, 2017, and twice in 2018 reflects their ongoing presence. This bombing is more tactical than random soft targets, often striking and sometimes military convoys.
From Boko Haram to National Chaos
The early 2010s were determined by the Brutal Boko Haram bombing campaign. These attacks are mostly urban areas, high fatality incidents centered in the northeast of Nigeria. The first large bombing recorded in the visual timeline occurred in December 2010 in the State Plateau, with a quick escalation after August 2011 when Boko Haram bombed the capital of Nigeria, Abuja (FCT). This marks the transition of rebel groups from regional terror organizations to national security threats.
In 2012, further attacks were recorded at Kaduna (April) and FCT (April), and in February 2015, the bombing had returned to the state of Borno – Benteng Boko Haram – showing their continuous grip on the region.
Awakening of Iswap and Geography Slide
In 2016, the shift began to be revealed. The rebellion began to break, with the West African Province (ISWAP) that emerged from Boko Haram. This fragmentation does not reduce violence; Conversely, it is localized and adapted. Data shows the bombing at Borno in June 2016, followed by an incident led by Iswap further in all states.
When Dataset took place to 2017 and 2018, several bombing incidents occurred in Borno, including those in December 2017 and February and July 2018. This reflects the ISWAP strategy to maintain pressure in the northeast while gradually expanding its operational zones.
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Threats from many actors
Dramatic changes become clear from 2023 and so on. The bombing is no longer limited to the Boko Haram -Iswap axis in the northeast. New actors and regions appear on the bombing map – including criminal bandits, separatist groups such as IPOB, and unknown armed men.
In January 2023, a bombing struck the state of Kogi – the central region was usually not related to rebel activities. More than a year later, in March 2024, Zamfara in Northwest witnessed an explosion caused by ISWAP, marking the beginning of the increasingly dangerous spread of bombings outside of traditional hotspots.
In 2024 and 2025, the incident exploded in frequency and distribution: April 2025 saw simultaneous bombings in IMO (southeast), benue (northcentral), and the state of Yobe (northeast), which show multi-actors or parallel operations. March 2025 alone recorded five separate bombing incidents throughout Abia, Sokoto, Borno, Cross River, and Kaduna – showed not only geographical spread but also operational simultaneity.
Data shows incidents by unknown armed people in countries such as Benue (April 2025), Cross River (March 2025), and Kogi (January 2023), signifying the increasing involvement of non-ideological, criminal, or ethnic militias in making bombs and distribution.
Ipob and southeast front
From a special note is the emergence of bombings in the southeast, especially in IMO and Enugu countries. In April 2025 and February 2025, the bombing at IMO was associated with IPOB, adding a new dimension to the security crisis – which was pushed not by religious extremism but by separatist agitation. Enugu’s attack in February 2024 further emphasized that separatist violence increasingly adopted a deadly tactic which was only associated with only Islamic rebels.
State -level data analysis revealed Borno as the center of the Nigerian bombing crisis. Between 2010 and 2025, the state recorded at least 11 incidents, more than the others. Kaduna and Zamfara followed carefully, after witnessing repeated attacks from time to time. In 2025 alone saw simultaneous bombings in Kaduna, Katsina, IMO, and Zamfara – a sign that many groups operate with alarming efficiency.
In the case of actor, groups that have been associated with religious extremism take into account around a dozen attacks throughout the timeline, especially concentrated in the northeast. Also, armed bandits are responsible for at least three bombings, showing an increase in sophistication and firing power. Meanwhile, separatist factions are associated with explosions in the IMO and Enugu and Fulani militias and unknown attackers now entering the commotion, further complicating the threat matrix.
This widespread adoption of explosives is a shift not only in geography, but in intentions and abilities. The uniformity of cross -ideological bombing – from criminal to politics – making detection, prevention, and response significantly more difficult.
By: James Odunayo