INEC Albatross: The Crisis of Electoral Confidence, by Dakuku Peterside

The main threat to Nigerian democracy is no longer a lack of understanding of elections, but the growing doubt that elections matter. What is often labeled voter apathy is actually a rational response.
When citizens believe their votes count, hope guides them; when manipulation seems possible, disengagement ensues, not out of contempt for democracy, but out of a sense of abandonment and frustration.

INEC now faces the challenge of restoring electoral confidence. The Commission is not just an election manager; it is the institution that confers democratic legitimacy. His conduct determines whether elections are accepted as legitimate or dismissed as empty rituals. As long as INEC’s trust is enjoyed, winners gain acceptance and losers concede peacefully; when INEC is distrusted, every action is viewed with suspicion and every outcome becomes a source of conflict.

Any honest assessment must begin with 2023. That election was supposed to mark a new era of transparency, anchored on INEC’s bimodal voter accreditation system and results viewing portal. INEC has repeatedly assured Nigerians that the technology would reduce the scope for manipulation. Those assurances raised expectations, especially among young voters and citizens who had begun to believe that the system could finally be forced to respect the vote. But on Election Day, the promise fell short where it mattered most. The presidential results were not uploaded in real time as expected, and INEC’s subsequent explanation that an “HTTP error” caused by a configuration bug had interrupted the presidential upload did little to heal the wound.

The problem wasn’t just the failure of the technology; it was a failed trust. INEC’s promises of transparency became central, and when those promises were broken, the damage was institutional. The European Union election observation mission said INEC’s failures undermined trust and recommended clearer laws, transparent appointments and real-time publication of results.

Once trust is broken on such a large scale, it cannot be restored by declarations alone; only coherent and transparent actions can begin to rebuild it. Therefore, the 2027 elections will not be routine: they will serve as a test of INEC’s credibility. This will also determine the survival of democracy in Nigeria.

The appointment of Professor Joash Ojo Amupitan in 2025 was intended as a new beginning. Although initially praised as apolitical, the new leadership alone cannot erase old doubts. Renewal does not come from biographies but from coherent conduct.

Controversy over social media allegations against the new president spread quickly. INEC’s investigation exonerated him, but the incident demonstrated how disinformation thrives where trust is weak. Stronger trust would have solved the problem quickly.

More worrying are controversies in INEC’s management of party affairs, such as the ADC leadership dispute. INEC cited court orders, while critics alleged interference. In a democracy, procedural fairness must be visible, not just claimed. Recent incidents show that public trust remains fragile.

Nowhere is this problem of perception more acute than in INEC’s oversight of party primaries and internal party affairs. Four pressing issues require urgent attention.

First, concerns persist about possible partisan appointments. Ultimately, elections are run by people, not abstractions. If resident election commissioners (RECs), election officials, ICT staff and other staff are perceived as politically compromised, the entire process is at risk. International IDEA has noted recurring disputes over appointments since 2015, and the situation has worsened in 2023. For example, lawmakers in Osun have alleged bias in the selection of officials for the 2026 elections: Whether these claims are true or not, they reveal growing fears that electoral integrity may be compromised even before they are voted on.

The second is the question of strategic redistributions. When key election officials are moved around important elections, especially when there is political pressure, trust in the electoral process suffers. INEC may have administrative reasons for moving staff, but in a climate of mistrust, timing is key. A redistribution may be legitimate, but if it appears to serve partisan convenience, it harms neutrality. The Commission must therefore learn that administrative opacity is no longer harmless. Every major personnel decision before a sensitive election must be explained clearly, proactively and publicly.

The third is INEC’s attempt to prescribe deadlines for party primaries in ways that the court found to be inconsistent with the Electoral Act 2026. In May 2026, the Federal High Court in Abuja invalidated INEC’s timetable for the conduct of primaries and the nomination of candidates, holding that INEC could not legally reduce the statutory periods granted to political parties for the filing, withdrawal and replacement of candidates. This was not a simple procedural dispute. It went to the heart of political participation. An election referee must regulate the game; it must not reshape the field to favor older, wealthier, better-established parties over emerging alternatives.

Issues of Administrative Convenience: Elections in Nigeria are logistically complex. But democracy does not serve to comfort administrators; it is at the service of the sovereignty of citizens. A calendar that forces parties into rushed primaries can aggravate internal crises, increase disputes, weaken party democracy and stifle reformist movements before the vote. Efficiency must never mean exclusion.

This is why the controversy over INEC’s 2027 calendar deserves attention. The Movement for a Credible Election has warned that INEC’s appeal against a ruling nullifying part of its calendar could further damage public confidence. The central question remains: an electoral umpire must not give the impression of limiting political participation. For elections, INEC should avoid imposing deadlines that appear to restrict participation. Administrative convenience is important, but it cannot prevail over democratic inclusion.

The fourth is the perception of selective urgency. Opposition parties often accuse INEC of acting quickly when internal disputes arise, while showing more patience when complications emerge with the ruling party. INEC can reject this charge and, in specific cases, can provide legal explanations. But the persistence of this perception is itself a failure of governance. A referee cannot afford to appear hasty on one side and hesitant on the other. Neutrality is not just a legal condition; it is a democratic performance that must be seen, felt and believed.

The structural problem is even deeper. Nigeria’s appointments picture still leaves INEC vulnerable to suspicion. The President appoints the INEC Chairman, subject to confirmation by the Senate. Both the executive and legislature are controlled by politicians with direct interests in election outcomes. Even when a president is personally competent, the path to office creates an inherited trust deficit. Until Nigeria develops a more transparent, multi-stakeholder and isolated appointment process, every INEC leadership will start under a cloud.

The Electoral Law 2026 offers some progress. President Tinubu signed the amended electoral law into law in February 2026, and the legislation gives statutory weight to the electronic transmission and IReV debate that has dominated public anger after 2023. But Nigerians have already learned a painful lesson: technology cannot save democracy where institutional will is weak. Machines can acquire, transmit and display information. They cannot produce integrity. If the law still leaves room for vague exceptions such as “communication failure,” then the manipulation architecture may be narrowed but not completely sealed. Legal analysts have rightly warned that indefinite failure to disclose can create evidentiary and liability problems in election disputes.

This is why the CENI crisis cannot be resolved with another portal, another device, another president or another guarantee. Credibility is built long before Election Day. It is integrated into the way ad hoc staff are recruited. It is an integral part of how disputes between parties are handled. It is an integral part of how court rulings are respected. It is baked into how procurement is disclosed, how technology is tested, how failures are explained, and how rules are consistently applied. Above all, it is built when the Commission demonstrates that it fears the law more than powerful politicians.

Political parties also have responsibilities. They cannot violate their own constitutions, sabotage their own primaries, produce endless internal crises and blame INEC for every consequence. Civil society must remain vigilant without becoming partisan. The media must investigate without amplifying falsehoods. Citizens must resist desperation without giving up the right to ask for better.

However, the biggest burden falls on INEC because the referee blows the whistle. If you have faith in the referee, the game can survive fierce competition. If the referee does not have confidence, even a fair decision will be interpreted as fraud.

The honest verdict is this: Nigerians have rational, evidence-based reasons to approach INEC with cautious skepticism rather than blind trust. This skepticism is not undemocratic. It is a demand that democracy live up to its name. Afrobarometer reported before the 2023 elections that only 23% of Nigerians trusted INEC “somewhat” or “a lot.” A Commission heading into 2027 with this kind of confidence deficit is not facing a public relations problem. He is faced with an institutional emergency.

The question, therefore, is not simply whether Nigerians should trust INEC. The more difficult question is whether INEC is willing to earn that trust before 2027.

Trust will not return through slogans. He will not return because a new president has been appointed. It will not return because the technology has been announced. It will only return when INEC obeys the law without arrogance, treats parties without discrimination, communicates without evasion, uses technology without excuses and conducts elections so transparently that even disappointed losers will find it hard to deny the integrity of the process.

Nigeria does not need a perfect electoral commission. No democracy has one. But Nigeria urgently needs an electoral commission whose neutrality is credible, whose promises are reliable and whose conduct reassures citizens that the vote remains stronger than manipulation.

For INEC, 2027 is more than another election. It is an opportunity for institutional redemption. For Nigeria, it could mean the difference between democracy as a living covenant and democracy as a tired ceremony.

The country does not ask INEC for miracles. We ask for honesty, correctness, competence and courage. This should not be too much to ask of an institution entrusted with the sovereignty of more than 200 million people.

*Dakuku Peterside is the author of Leading in a Storm and Beneath the Surface.