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The renewed debate over the state police has once again exposed the deep fractures in Nigeria’s governance and security architecture. In a recent interview, Professor Chidi Odinkalu made a strong warning: the introduction of the state police in the current political context, particularly on the eve of general elections, risks institutionalizing partisan coercion rather than improving public safety.
His speech deserves careful attention.
Professor Odinkalu argues that Nigeria is already in an election season, making this an inappropriate time to undertake such a profound reform as the creation of the state police. He warns that rushed legislation without transparent public consultation, adequate institutional preparation, adequate training infrastructure or effective oversight could transform existing political militias into officially armed state security forces. Drawing on the findings of MD Yusuf’s 2008 Presidential Committee on Police Reform, he recalls how politically connected criminals managed to force their way into police recruitment during previous mass recruitment exercises. His concern is that history could repeat itself on an even larger scale.
He also argues that many states lack the financial capacity to support professional police services. States struggling to pay salaries and pensions are unlikely to maintain well-trained, adequately equipped and accountable police institutions. In such circumstances, poorly paid officers carrying state-supplied weapons can become vulnerable to corruption, political manipulation and abuse.
These concerns are legitimate and should not be ignored.
For years, the Rule of Law and Accountability Advocacy Center Rulaac (RULAAC) has consistently argued that Nigeria’s centralized policing structure is no longer fit for purpose. Nigeria’s police force is overstretched, under-resourced, distant from many communities, and unable to effectively respond to the country’s complex and localized security challenges. From rural banditry to urban crime, communal violence, kidnapping and organized crime, a centrally controlled police force cannot adequately police a country as large and diverse as Nigeria.
However, recognizing the failure of centralized policing does not necessarily mean embracing a state policing model devoid of guarantees
The debate should not be framed as a choice between the status quo and an unrestricted transfer of police powers to state governors. Rather, the challenge is to design a truly decentralized policing system that strengthens public safety while preventing political abuse.
Professor Odinkalu rightly reminds us that Nigerian governors have often demonstrated intolerance towards political opposition. Independent state election commissions have become tools for creating single-party dominance at the local level. Supervisory structures in different states have, at different times, been manipulated for partisan purposes. These experiences cannot simply be ignored.
However, these failures are not arguments against decentralization itself. These are arguments in favor of building strong institutions of accountability.
RULAAC has consistently argued that any transition to state or subnational policing must be accompanied by constitutional and institutional safeguards that insulate the police from partisan political control. Such safeguards should include independent police service commissions at the state level, transparent recruitment processes, uniform professional standards at the national level, independent civil complaint mechanisms, robust legislative oversight, judicial accountability, operational autonomy for police leadership, and effective federal oversight limited to constitutional compliance and protection of fundamental rights.
Equally important is the sequence.
The creation of the state police should not become an emergency political project driven by electoral calculations. Institutional design must precede implementation. Recruitment standards must precede recruitment. Training institutions must precede police powers. Accountability systems must precede operational authority.
Nigeria’s experience teaches us that poorly designed security institutions often become generators of insecurity rather than providers of security.
Professor Odinkalu also links Nigeria’s insecurity to the broader crisis of democratic legitimacy. His argument that credible elections are essential for sustainable security deserves serious reflection. Governments whose legitimacy rests on the genuine consent of citizens are generally more accountable to citizens and more responsive to their security needs. Electoral integrity and security sector reform are therefore mutually reinforcing rather than competing priorities.
However, Nigeria’s insecurity also reflects structural weaknesses in policing, intelligence coordination, criminal justice administration, economic exclusion and governance more generally. Election reform alone cannot solve these challenges, just as the state police alone cannot.
What Nigeria needs is a comprehensive reform of security governance.
This includes the full implementation of the Police Act 2020, the professionalisation of the Nigeria Police Force, strengthening intelligence-led policing, improving police wellbeing, expanding community policing based on accountability rather than political clientelism, modernizing forensic and investigative capacity, and thoughtfully developing constitutionally protected sub-national policing.
The central question should not be whether Nigeria should have a state police.
The real question is what kind of state police Nigeria should have.
If the state police merely transferred coercive powers from Abuja to thirty-six state governors without creating democratic guarantees, transparency, professional independence and effective oversight, Nigeria would simply decentralize abuses rather than security.
If, however, decentralization becomes part of a broader democratic reform agenda anchored in constitutionalism, accountability, professionalism and respect for human rights, state policing can become an important component of a more responsive and effective security architecture.
Nigeria’s security crisis requires bold reforms. But courageous reforms must also be wise reforms.
When it comes to policing, institutional design is not a technical detail: it represents the difference between protecting democracy and endangering it.
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