Ramaphosa and the test of African democracy: when…

In my PhD class on governance and leadership, at the Abuja Leadership Center where we are doing the comparative analysis of governance and leadership in Africa, we have just covered the difficult question of institutions and accountability.

We have noted how institutional integrity underpins and supports accountability, but unfortunately how this is lacking in many African countries, including Nigeria. Institutions often exist in form and not in performance.

It is in this context that I share my thoughts on a constitutional issue coming out of South Africa, away from the xenophobic tensions in that country.

The ruling of the Constitutional Court of South Africa against Cyril Ramaphosa, the South African president, is much bigger than the fate of a president. It is a profound institutional moment for Africa. This raises a difficult but necessary question across the continent: Can African democracies build institutions strong enough to confront power without fear or compromise?

At the heart of the ruling is a principle that many African states proclaim constitutionally but struggle to put into practice politically: no public office, including the presidency, is above accountability.

The symbolism is amazing. On the 30th anniversary of South Africa’s constitutional democracy, the country’s Supreme Court has reminded Parliament that constitutional obligations are not optional and that political convenience cannot prevail over institutional responsibility.

The court did not find Ramaphosa guilty. Rather, he was asserting something even more important for democratic governance: Allegations against a sitting president must be subjected to legal scrutiny and not buried through partisan maneuvering.

This distinction matters immensely.

In many African countries, accountability mechanisms formally exist but collapse in the face of executive power. Anti-corruption agencies become selective. Legislatures become extensions of the parties in power.

Courts are pressured through cronyism, intimidation, delayed appointments, or budget dependence. Regulatory institutions often act aggressively against opposition figures, but with caution towards incumbents.

The case of South Africa demonstrates what happens when institutions maintain sufficient autonomy to resist this model.

The implications for governance in Africa are therefore enormous.

First, the ruling reinforces the idea that constitutionalism must prevail over personality cults. In much of Africa, politics is excessively personalized. Leaders become synonymous with the state.

Criticism of the government is interpreted as hostility towards the nation itself. Institutions are weakened because loyalty to individuals replaces loyalty to constitutional processes.

The South African court has upset this logic. He essentially told Parliament: your constitutional duty is not to protect the president; is to protect the Constitution. This is the essence of a mature democracy.

Secondly, the ruling highlights the central importance of institutional accessibility. Citizens, opposition parties, civil society organizations, journalists and constitutional actors were able to activate legal processes that reached the highest court.

In this case, accessibility does not simply mean physical access to courts; it means the existence of functional democratic channels through which power can be challenged peacefully and legally.

In many African states, citizens often resort to protests, unrest, or international pressure because national institutions are inaccessible, compromised, or ineffective.

When courts function credibly, they become stabilization mechanisms. They channel political crises into legal judgments rather than street clashes. This is one reason why strong institutions are essential not only for democracy but for national stability itself.

Third, the case reveals the tension between party dominance and democratic accountability. The African National Congress (ANC) has historically enjoyed overwhelming political dominance rooted in its liberation legacy. Like many dominant parties across Africa, it faces a recurring temptation: protecting party power at the expense of institutional integrity.

This model is familiar continentally. In several African democracies, ruling parties use parliamentary majorities not to enforce accountability but to protect leaders from scrutiny. Impeachment trials become mathematically impossible because lawmakers prioritize partisan survival over constitutional obligation.

The South African ruling directly calls this model into question. It warns lawmakers that parliamentary numbers cannot legitimize unconstitutional conduct indefinitely.

Can something similar happen in Nigeria?

Legally yes. Institutionally and politically it is much more complicated.

The Constitution of Nigeria provides mechanisms for legislative review, judicial review and even impeachment of a president. The National Assembly has investigative powers. The judiciary has the constitutional power to interpret executive actions. Anti-corruption agencies theoretically possess prosecutorial independence.

But practical realities significantly weaken these mechanisms.

An important challenge is executive dominance over institutions. Nigerian presidents historically wield enormous influence through appointments, security structures, patronage networks and fiscal control. This creates a political environment in which institutions often calculate survival before asserting independence.

Another problem is the fragility of legislative autonomy. In theory, the National Assembly should act as a check on the excesses of the executive. In practice, political alignments, party interests, defections, patronage politics, and fears of political retaliation often dilute legislative courage. Oversight hearings can generate headlines without producing accountability.

The judiciary, while at times courageous, also operates under severe pressure: delayed reforms, accusations of selective justice, conflicting judgments on politically sensitive issues, and public perceptions of vulnerability to elite influence. Where public confidence in judicial neutrality weakens, enforcement of the Constitution becomes fragile.

Nigeria therefore illustrates the difference between constitutional existence and constitutional effectiveness.

A Constitution alone does not guarantee accountability. Institutions become strong only when political culture, civic oversight, judicial independence, media freedom, and elite moderation converge to protect them.

This is where the South African case becomes profoundly instructive for Africa.

Strong institutions are not built simply by drafting good constitutions. Almost all African states already have impressive constitutional language. The real challenge lies in institutionalizing moderation, teaching political elites that power must submit to the law even when it is inconvenient.

Africa’s governance crisis often depends less on the absence of laws and more on the selective application of laws.

The Ramaphosa issue also raises important questions about democratic maturity. A democracy becomes credible not when leaders are impeccable, but when institutions can investigate leaders without the state collapsing.

Responsibility should not be confused with instability. In fact, suppressing accountability is what ultimately breeds instability as unresolved grievances accumulate beneath the surface.

There is also an important continental governance lesson regarding legitimacy.

Modern African citizens. especially the younger generations. they increasingly require transparent governance, institutional fairness and fair application of the law. Liberation credentials, ethnic loyalties and populist rhetoric no longer guarantee permanent immunity from scrutiny.
This change is fundamental.

African societies are gradually transitioning from liberation-era political psychology towards performance-based democratic expectations. Citizens are increasingly asking not who fought for freedom or democracy decades ago, but who governs responsibly today.

The South African ruling therefore symbolizes an evolving democratic consciousness in Africa: institutions matter more than personalities.

However, the outcome will ultimately depend on the ability of institutions to maintain their courage outside the courtroom. Judicial rulings alone cannot transform governance if political actors neutralize accountability through procedural delays, elite bargaining, or partisan protection. The real test now lies with Parliament and the ANC itself.

Will constitutional duty prevail over political convenience?

This question resonates far beyond South Africa. It is aimed directly at Nigeria and many African states where institutions often find themselves at the crossroads between democratic principle and partisan survival.

Ultimately, the most important lesson that can be drawn from this episode is that Africa’s future does not depend on strong men but on strong systems. Nations become stable, prosperous, and democratic when institutions can question power without fear, when citizens can demand justice without intimidation, and when constitutions are treated not as symbolic documents but as binding social contracts.

The tragedy affecting much of Africa is not simply corruption or poor leadership. It is the persistent weakening of institutions designed to prevent both.

The South African Court has now demonstrated what institutional courage is. Whether the political system maintains this courage will determine not only Ramaphosa’s fate, but the deeper credibility of constitutional democracy in Africa itself.

■ Ukertor Gabriel Moti is a professor of public sector management and governance

#Stronginstitutions, #weakenedinstitutions, #strongmen, #strongwomen, #strongdemocracy.

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